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 STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
‘TECHNOLOGIES OF RATIONALITY’ IN PRACTICE 
 
Abstract: In response to critiques of strategy tools as unhelpful or potentially dangerous for 
organizations, we suggest casting a sociological eye on how tools are actually mobilized by 
strategy makers. In conceptualizing strategy tools as tools-in-use, we offer a framework for 
examining the ways that the affordances of strategy tools and the agency of strategy makers 
interact to shape how and when tools are selected and applied. Further, rather than evaluating the 
‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ use of tools, we highlight the variety of outcomes that result, not just for 
organizations but also for the tools and the individuals who use them. We illustrate this 
framework with a vignette and propose an agenda and methodological approaches for further 
scholarship on the use of strategy tools. 
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STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
‘TECHNOLOGIES OF RATIONALITY’ IN PRACTICE 
 
In business schools, when we teach strategy we introduce students to various strategy tools – 
such as Five Forces (Porter, 1980), strategic group maps (McGee and Thomas, 1986), or the 
BCG growth-share matrix (Henderson, 1979). Research suggests that managers use such tools to 
support situation analysis and evaluation of strategic choices (Grant, 2003; Orndoff, 2002; 
Tapinos et al., 2005). Managers use tools in what they consider to be rational processes of 
strategic decision-making (Cabantous and Gond, 2011; Jarratt and Stiles, 2010). Yet, March 
(2006: 211) (and others such as Mintzberg, 1994; 2004) critique an excessive trust in these 
‘technologies of rationality,’ as potentially inappropriate props for decision making that ‘defend 
a utopia of the mind against the realism of experience.’  
Bridging this gap between the ‘utopia of the mind’ (the theory of how strategy tools 
should be used) and the ‘realism of experience’ (how managers actually use tools) falls squarely 
into the strategy-as-practice research agenda (Balogun et al., 2007; Golsorkhi et al., 2010; 
Johnson et al., 2007; Orlikowski, 2010; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). To address this challenge, 
Whittington (2007: 1577-1578) suggests we take a ‘sociological eye’ to strategy, examining not 
only specific tools or actors, but also the rich interactions within which people and ‘things’ are 
engaged in doing strategy work. A sociological eye encourages close attention to tools as they 
are used in context, the motivations of actors in using them, the purposes to which tools are put, 
and their potential to lead to an array of sometimes unanticipated outcomes. In this paper, we 
develop a framework for seeing strategy tools through such a lens, probing their selection, their 
application and the outcomes associated with their use. To gain traction on this agenda, we treat 
strategy tools as tools-in-use, much as research on technology has approached ‘technologies-in-
use’ (Orlikowski, 2000; Orlikowski and Barley, 2001).  
The term ‘tool’ is a generic name for frameworks, concepts, models or methods. The 
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purposes of our paper, we focus specifically on strategy tools, such as Porter’s Five Forces, that 
codify knowledge about strategy-making within structured approaches to strategy analysis, often 
through some form of propositional or visual representation (March, 2006; Worren et al., 2002). 
We focus on these tools because they embed particular content and methods for structuring 
thinking that may have implications for the practice of strategy (Worren et al., 2002). March 
(2006) calls these tools ‘technologies of rationality’ because they offer models of causal 
structures, provide spaces for collecting data, and establish decision rules for selecting among 
alternatives. That is, the tools support what Simon (1978: 9) calls ‘procedural rationality’ to help 
actors make rational choices for the firm given the limits of human cognitive powers (Cabantous 
and Gond, 2011). 
Strategy tools are intended to be useful in coping with the uncertainties associated with 
strategy making. Yet, March (2006: 203) claims that it is precisely in periods of greatest 
uncertainty that use of such tools can be inappropriate: decision-making ‘disasters’ may stem 
from the oversimplification or misrepresentation encoded in tools. He argues that technologies of 
rationality are less reliable where the environment is uncertain, the situation is causally complex, 
preferences are ambiguous, or there are important interpersonal tradeoffs (March, 2006: 208). 
Managers may make inapt use of tools by getting the ‘wrong’ information or overlooking 
important variables. They may also use tools for rhetorical purposes to justify positions that 
support their political interests. Such actions are cast as failures (or even deliberate distortion and 
deviance) in using tools, which can lead to poor strategic outcomes.  
From a practice perspective, the search for such individual- or organizational-level 
rationality can be seen as a product of a Western culture that values rationality as a supposedly 
neutral basis of thought and action (Cabantous and Gond, 2011; Feldman and March, 1981; 
Langley, 1989). That is, rationality is a normative ideal that gets instantiated through the 
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practices of individuals intending to be rational as they make strategy. Following this approach, 
we seek to examine the practices of individuals working with tools in the context of this 
normative ideal. In doing so, we portray strategy tools as fluid objects that, through their 
selection and application by particular actors in particular contexts, produce a variety of 
outcomes for different stakeholders, including the degree of exploration provoked, resolution 
achieved, satisfaction with the process, discretion or competence of the actor, and routinization 
of the tool in an organization’s practice. Our approach suggests that evaluating the correct (and 
rational) or incorrect (and ‘irrational,’ at least according to some definitions) use of tools is a 
problematic dichotomy that obscures the multiple outcomes relevant to managers and 
organizations and directs attention away from the dynamics involved in using such technologies 
of rationality. 
We draw on emerging research on strategy tools to highlight what is known and unknown 
and then illustrate the dynamics of strategy tools-in-use through a vignette. Our framework 
informs a research agenda that directs us to examine the actors using strategy tools, the 
multiplicity of potential outcomes and the social processes that produce them. Further, this 
framework can help developers of strategy tools understand the affordances (possibilities and 
constraints) that such tools create. And it can help teachers position strategy tools not simply as 
answers to specific problems but as parts of complex organizational processes that involve both 
individual and organizational objectives.  
A FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE 
We apply a practice lens to develop a framework of strategy tools-in-use (Figure 1). In this 
section, we outline the implications of a practice lens on understanding tools and the actors who 
use them and then, in the next section, explain how tools and actors interact in the selection, 
application and outcomes of tools-in-use (Arrows 1-6 in Figure 1). We describe each of the 
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elements of the framework with reference to existing literature and develop a series of statements 
about the way these relationships work (as catalogued in Table 1). The statements explicate the 
association between tools and actors based on the evidence we have or can infer from current 
research and also provide the grounds for an empirical research agenda on tools-in-use. The 
framework also highlights the feedback loops through which selection, application and outcomes 
shape each other (Arrows A-C in Figure 1). While a practice lens suggests that these 
relationships are important, little is known about their role. In a subsequent section, we offer 
supplemental statements as a starting point for future explorations of these recursive dynamics. 
-- Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here -- 
Research on strategy tools per se is limited. Much of the early interest was in 
practitioner-oriented journals. Only more recently, as part of the strategy-as-practice movement, 
studies of strategy tools have begun to penetrate the periphery of scholarly journals. Therefore, to 
develop these statements, we benefit from studies of related tools and techniques (e.g., Balanced 
Scorecard, formal analysis), other enabling technologies (e.g., PowerPoint, meetings, off-site 
‘away days’), and, more broadly, formal analysis, accounting practices, and technologies-in-use. 
Affordances of tools  
As with technologies-in-use, a practice lens highlights that strategy tools come with affordances 
that enable and constrain their use (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). By affordances, we mean that, 
as Zammuto et al (2007: 752) say, ‘the materiality of an object favors, shapes or invites, and at 
the same time constrains, a set of specific uses’ (see also Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). For 
example, a chair may be intended as a seat, but actors may use it as a stepping stool, a coffee 
table, a barrier to keep a child away from a fireplace, a bookshelf, etc. (but not likely as a pen, a 
window shade or a cook stove). The use depends not only on the material properties, nor on the 
intended design of the tool, but also on the context and the interpretations of actors who may use 
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the technologies in creative, unpredictable ways (Faraj and Azad, 2012; Jarzabkowski and Pinch, 
2014). The literature on affordances emphasizes that tools and technologies are as much 
conceptual as material devices through which actors pursue multiple ends, such as negotiating 
about the content of PowerPoint slides (Kaplan, 2011) or using Blackberry devices to manage 
workflow (Mazmanian and Orlikowski, 2013). We are encouraged to consider the way tools and 
technologies provide interpretive, as well as material, affordances for action (Darr and Pinch, 
2013).  
Strategy tools, similarly, have both material and conceptual affordances that shape their 
use. Strategy tools come with choices embedded in them about what knowledge to privilege. 
Researchers have suggested that the content of artifacts ‘disguise[es] itself as information, rather 
than argument’ (Meyer et al., 2013: 6). By implication, a strategy tool is not neutral or 
‘objective,’ but makes an argument about what is important to analyze strategically and, 
conversely, what is not. For example, critiques of Porter’s Five Forces have claimed that, by 
featuring buyers, suppliers, barriers to entry, substitutes and rivalry, the tool may direct managers 
away from exploring other industry dynamics such as complementors (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996). While the designers of tools may intend them to be selected for particular tasks, 
to be applied in certain ways and to achieve certain outcomes, these intentions may or may not 
be realized as actors engage with the tools. Actors’ perceptions of a tool’s affordances will shape 
its use such that tools should not be understood separately from their use (Orlikowski, 2000, 
2010; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008).  
For example, Chesley and Wenger’s (1999) study of the Balanced Scorecard shows that 
many features – from the labels to the meanings attributed to different boxes in the worksheet – 
may be altered during use. Sometimes these changes are done to reflect the specifics of a 
particular situation, but they are also made by individuals wishing to guide conversations in 
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particular directions. As accounting scholars have demonstrated, changes in an accounting 
framework or metric may be manifestations of the interpretations and interests of different actors 
(Feldman, 2004; Gephart, 1997; Nahapiet, 1988; Power, 2003). We can infer from these studies 
that tools have affordances that shape the way that actors frame problems but can also enable 
actors to advance their own interests in that problem.  
Agency of actors in using tools  
In conceptualizing tools ‘in use,’ we necessarily highlight the actors who use them. A practice 
lens draws attention to what actors do as they make strategy (Vaara and Whittington, 2012) and 
emphasizes that people ‘enact technologies in multiple ways’ (Boudreau and Robey, 2005, p. 4). 
March (2006) conceptualizes tools as ‘technologies of rationality’ based on assumptions of 
procedural rationality: individuals, even though cognitively limited, ‘attempt to collect the 
information necessary to form expectations about various alternatives, and [use] this information 
in the final decision’ (Dean and Sharfman, 1993: 1071). In this view, people make strategic 
choices based on some ‘model-based assessment of the likelihoods of different possible future 
outcomes and of preferences among them’ (March 2006: 203). These preferences may be 
associated with the best interests of the firm (where political action would be seen as irrational) 
or with the best interests of the individual decision maker (where political action can be seen as 
rational) (Dean and Sharfman, 1993).  
A practice lens offers an alternative view of the achievement of rationality. It suggests 
that, when making strategy, actors are seeking to conform to the normative ideal of rationality 
(Cabantous and Gond, 2011; Langley, 1988) where the use of strategy tools is part of that 
rationality-seeking process. Using tools may enable actors to feel rational (Pondy, 1983) and to 
convey an appearance of rationality to others (Feldman and March, 1981). Therefore, while a 
practice lens calls into question March’s (2006) characterization of strategy tools as 
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‘technologies of rationality,’ it recognizes that they can function as technologies of intended 
rationality, or ‘rationality carriers’ (Cabantous and Gond, 2011: 577; Dodgson et al., 2013). 
Further, using a strategy tool signifies the user as a strategist, able to conform to and perform 
within the wider norms and discourses of strategy making (Knights and Morgan, 1991).  
Research on users of strategy tools has focused primarily on senior executives (Frost, 
2003; Stenfors et al., 2007). Those at the top of the organization are likely to have hierarchically 
derived power to choose tools – consciously or unconsciously – and control their application 
(Hill and Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson et al., 2006). However, a practice lens directs us to 
consider the wide variety of actors involved in strategy-making, not just top managers, but also 
middle managers and those outside the organization, such as consultants (Whittington, 2007).  
Middle managers are likely to see strategy tools as a way to engage in strategy 
conversations laterally across divisions (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) or to influence upwards 
(Floyd and Lane, 2000; Mantere and Vaara, 2008). Senior managers may regard tools as a means 
of conveying information and presenting positive images of a strategy (Grant, 2003; Ketokivi 
and Castaner, 2004; Mantere and Vaara, 2008). Consultants might regard the use of tools as a 
professional skill that gives them status and expertise to act across organizations (McKenna, 
2006). Research on strategy making implies that the outcomes of using tools will include not 
only their effectiveness for problem-solving but also the returns that may accrue to actors from 
their use, e.g., demonstrating competence as a strategist (Mantere, 2008), gaining support for 
particular views (Kaplan, 2008) and resolving interpersonal and political differences (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977). 
STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE: SELECTION, APPLICATION AND OUTCOMES 
Actors and tools interact in the selection, application and achievement of outcomes associated 
with the tools-in-use. While the developers of tools may design them with specific types of 
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strategic problems in mind, it is not clear that managers inside organizations pick or use tools for 
these reasons. There is much to suggest that the choice of tools is shaped by actors’ competence 
in their use, power in their organization, and their boundedly rational satisficing where, in many 
cases, a wide variety of tools would be considered suitable for a particular strategic issue. 
Similarly, tools are not only applied to solve an organization’s strategic problems. A practice 
lens leads scholars to focus on the use of tools for creating common language about strategy and 
offering spaces for the negotiation of interests. Such uses enable actors to make sense of the 
world, transform the uncertain into the more certain, and demonstrate their own mastery in 
strategy making. A practice lens on the selection and application of tools thus offers a more 
expansive menu of potential outcomes to examine in the strategy making process, from the 
institutionalization of a tool to its impact on the satisfaction and careers of the users to the ability 
to move the organization forward in the face of uncertainty.  
In this section, we dissect the selection, application and outcomes of tools-in-use, 
examining how they are shaped by both the affordances of the tools and the agency of the actors. 
In doing so we develop a series of statements (as numbered in Table 1) about possible 
relationships that provide the grounds for empirical exploration in future research. While we 
endeavor for analytical purposes to draw out the directionality of relationships, the influences are 
recursive, such that actors shape the use of tools for strategy making, and, correspondingly, tools 
shape the way that actors do strategy making.  
Selection  
One key question is how and why actors select particular strategy tools to use for specific 
applications (Arrows 1 and 2 in Figure 1). A rational perspective implies that managers 
consciously select tools that will be most effective for solving the particular problem that they 
face. However, the practice lens highlights that there is no one right tool for any situation and 
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that strategists’ choices of tools may be unconscious and routinized in organizational practice 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011).   
Affordances of tools in tool selection (Arrow 1).  
March (2006) questions the appropriateness of strategy tools for problem-solving in uncertain 
environments, and other scholars have expressed concerns about strategy tools being obsolete 
under changing industry conditions (D'Aveni and Gunther, 1995; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Yet existing literature provides little evidence that managers vary their tool use under conditions 
of change and uncertainty (Grant, 2003; Koufopoulos and Chryssochoidis, 2000). While some 
minimal industry variation is found in the number of tools used in different industries, it is not 
correlated with complexity or uncertainty (Frost, 2003; Stenfors et al 2007).  
Some tools, for example Porter’s (1980) Five Forces, get taken up in nearly every core 
strategic management course in business schools and in the practice of many strategic 
management consultants (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Kachra and Schnietz, 2008; Knott, 2008). 
Five Forces is thus a tool that is both highly familiar and also has a recognized scholarly 
pedigree (with some refinements, see Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; and some more 
substantive disagreements, see Farjoun, 2007; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006). This familiarity means 
that the Five Forces tool is accessible and widely embedded within organizational strategy-
making processes (Argyres et al., 2002; Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Grant, 2003), which may lead 
actors to select it for tasks for which it was not intended (e.g., company rather than industry 
analysis).  
Similarly, the SWOT (strength, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) framework (Andrews, 
1971) is used even more frequently in organizations, though perhaps taught less in business 
schools today (Ghazinoory et al., 2011). This framework has been assailed as having little 
intellectual content (Hill and Westbrook, 1997), yet its use is routinized in many organizations. 
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Scholars posit that managers prefer this tool because it is familiar and easy to use, requiring no 
training or specific competence to understand and apply it (Frost, 2003). The investment in 
searching and acquiring the competence to use a different tool may not be worth the effort, when 
existing tools are ready-to-hand. Rather than their applicability to a task, familiarity may be a 
key reason for using particular tools that are already embedded in organizational practice and 
widely recognized by other actors. McCabe and Narayanan’s (1991) survey of portfolio planning 
tools notes that, once institutionalized within firms’ planning processes, tools are used 
persistently, independent of context. We therefore suggest that the selection of tools may be 
more dependent on standardized organizational use than on the ‘fit’ of the tool with the situation 
in the environment (statement 1.1 in Table 1).  
Tool selection may also be influenced by the degree to which tools are simple and offer 
clear visual representations; simpler tools are easier to remember and use (statement 1.2). For 
example, the BCG matrix is memorable because of its evocative labels of cash cow, dog and star 
and the two-by-two matrix suggested for sorting businesses into different categories (Armstrong 
and Brodie, 1994). Similarly, we may speculate that the mnemonic character of Porter’s Five 
Forces, with its alliterative name and its relatively few concepts have aided its uptake (Worren et 
al, 2002).  
Given that strategy-making is concerned with profit and loss, forecasting, and financial 
performance, the ‘number-crunching’ properties of tools will likely shape their selection 
(Whittington, 1996: 732). Quantitative tools may be desired in particular contexts. Grant’s 
(2003) study of strategic planning in the oil majors shows that long-term planning required 
qualitative and scenario-based information, whereas medium-term planning required quantitative 
information and financial analysis techniques. Quantitative tools may also be attractive because 
numbers can signal rationality due to their association with accuracy (Denis et al., 2006). On the 
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other hand, quantitative tools may be harder to use. For example, ‘real options’ is a strategy tool 
designed for ‘big bet’ industries, such as oil or mining (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). It enables 
managers to experiment with a range of possible strategic options while retaining the ability to 
exit at relatively low cost (McGrath, 1997; Miller and Waller, 2003). Yet, one of the criticisms 
of the real options tool is that its mathematical complexity may have restricted its uptake: 
managers simply lack the competence to use it (Remer et al., 2001). The selection of quantitative 
tools is thus attractive to users because numbers can signal rationality, but this attractiveness is 
offset by potentially greater difficulty in using the tool (statement 1.3). 
Agency of actors in tool selection (Arrow 2).  
Selection of strategy tools involves interaction between the affordances of the tools and the 
agency of the actors who use them. One way to understand this interaction is through 
behavioralist theories (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1947), as we might imagine that 
managers are satisficers when they select the tools to use. Rather than search for a ‘best’ tool, 
which, even if hypothetically possible to find, would require considerable time to learn to use 
(Haspeslagh, 1982; Stenfors et al., 2007), managers tend to use tools already embedded within 
their organization’s strategy-making processes (McCabe and Narayanan, 1991). The ‘garbage 
can’ (Cohen et al., 1972) might be a model of how people select strategy tools. That is, given a 
particular circumstance, they will pick the first tool that they know how to use (or with which 
they are familiar) that seems to fit the problem at hand (statement 2.1).  
This effect may be reinforced by the power dynamics of the organization (Hill and 
Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson et al., 2006). One obvious source of power is that flowing from 
hierarchy. A recent survey finds that senior managers use more strategy tools than lower level 
managers (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). The support of the CEO also plays a crucial part in the 
adoption of strategy tools (Stenfors et al., 2007). For example, Haspeslagh (1982) shows that 
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higher CEO commitment was associated with successful adoption of portfolio planning tools. 
Even where other managers initiated use of the tool, signals from the CEO such as investing time 
and personal engagement aided adoption. Thus, actors have more or less freedom to select a tool 
depending on their position in the hierarchy (statement 2.2). 
Expertise is another source of power (French and Raven, 1968) that shapes the selection 
of strategy tools. Managers may select a tool because it allows them to demonstrate their 
educational status and competence. Studies show that receiving an MBA enables actors to feel 
competent in proposing and using tools (Jarratt and Stiles, 2010), and managers with higher 
postgraduate and executive training use a greater number of strategy tools (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013). Furthermore, MBA-educated managers jealously guard their competence from colleagues 
that have not had MBA training, using their education to further their own careers, rather than 
sharing knowledge about tools with their teams (Legge et al., 2007). Thus, actors have more or 
less freedom to select a tool depending on their competence in its use (statement 2.3). 
Application  
When seen through a practice lens, the application of tools is situated within specific social 
contexts and shaped by both the affordances of the tools and the actors who apply them (Arrows 
3 and 4, Figure 1). Studies suggesting that using the ‘wrong’ tools (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) or 
using tools in the ‘wrong’ way (Lozeau et al., 2002) is bad for management practice promote a 
false dichotomy between correct and incorrect use that obscures the many improvisations that 
occur as tools are used in practice (Orlikowski, 1996; Whittington, 2006; Worren et al., 2002). 
While the designers of strategy tools may intend certain applications, this does not guarantee that 
tools will be used as intended. A survey of Fortune 1000 companies shows that strategy tools 
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such as PIMS1 and BCG ‘star/dog’ models have increasingly been applied in theoretically 
unanticipated ways, as managers become familiar with their principles and adapt them to include 
new dimensions (e.g., stockholder value) (McCabe and Narayanan, 1991). Haspeslagh (1982:65) 
shows that portfolio planning tools are more useful where managers remove the ‘theoretical 
mask’ of their intended use for corporate level portfolio planning and apply the tools at multiple 
levels, including within strategic business units. As an executive in a survey of tool use in 
Finnish companies responded, ‘[The methods behind the tools] are not important in practice if 
the work gets done’ (Stenfors et al., 2007: 933). 
Affordances of strategy tools in their application (Arrow 3).  
Because tools have interpretive flexibility, users can adapt them according to their interpretations 
and interests. Haspeslagh (1982) found that when managers in multinationals stuck too 
rigorously to the theoretical bases of a portfolio planning tool, they generated hundreds of items 
to plot in their corporate portfolio, an exercise that many ultimately found unhelpful. More 
usefully, portfolio-planning tools enabled managers to think about the various missions of their 
strategic business units. The more experienced managers were in using portfolio-planning tools, 
the more successful they were in adapting them to their various needs. These adaptations 
violated the intended use of the tools and could therefore be seen as incorrect and potentially 
error prone. One might imagine that this would lead managers to discard tools. Yet, McCabe and 
Narayanan (1991) find that the use of strategy tools, even as they are adapted sometimes beyond 
recognition, persists in organizations. The practice lens suggests that such tools persist because 
they afford a variety of useful organizational functions.  
Strategy making often requires people from different parts of the organization (different 
divisions, different functions) to work together. Because these people will likely come from 
                                                 
1
 PIMS stands for ‘profit impact of marketing strategy’ and is a tool used to identify key performance criteria in 
organizations (Buzzell et al., 1975) 
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different ‘thought worlds’ (Dougherty, 1992), they must find a means for overcoming 
interpretive barriers. Various studies have shown the importance of fostering strategic 
conversations across multiple managerial levels, functions and divisions as part of generating 
buy-in to strategy (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009; Mantere and Vaara, 
2008). A critical feature of this process is generating a common language across these 
boundaries. Research on boundary-spanning work in other domains (such as new product 
development) has shown that artifacts can serve important roles in bridging divides and creating 
shared reference points. These artifacts can be characterized as ‘boundary objects,’ in that they 
mediate relations between diverse groups to enable problem solving across boundaries (Bechky, 
2003; Carlile, 2002; Levina and Vaast, 2005; Star and Griesemer, 1989). Building on these ideas, 
some scholars have proposed that strategy tools might play a similar role (Spee and 
Jarzabkowski, 2009; Stenfors et al., 2007), providing a common language for strategic 
conversations between managers across hierarchical, functional and geographic boundaries 
(statement 3.1). 
Strategy tools can also create spaces for social interactions that allow actors to negotiate 
their different interests (statement 3.2). That is, strategy making is both an interpretive and a 
political process (Kaplan, 2008). Differences across boundaries demand not just shared language 
but also resolution of the tensions arising because different groups of actors have different things 
at stake (Carlile, 2002). Chesley and Wenger’s (1999) study of the Balanced Scorecard finds that 
the tool created a space for managers to negotiate their anxieties and political interests about the 
introduction of new performance measures by enabling them to revisit and revise the dimensions 
of the tool. Providing sites for social interaction and participation in strategy making across 
organizational levels can have positive effects on performance, even where consensus is not an 
outcome (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Further, tools may also be used to realign resources and 
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sources of power in the organization. Tools are powerful to the extent that they map on to (or can 
be adapted to) the existing interests of the dominant actors in an organization (Denis et al., 2006) 
or if they are useful in realigning those interests and views. 
Carlile (2004) points out that, where differences between groups are known, the boundary 
objects used to negotiate these differences can be relatively stable. However, with increasing 
complexity and uncertainty – the kind that March (2006) highlights as problematic – negotiations 
across boundaries involves transforming knowledge, typically by changing the meaning of the 
objects used by participants. As managers appropriate the tools, they change them. But the 
possible scope of these improvisations is not infinite. As Pentland and Feldman (2008: 243) 
remark: ‘A personal computer can be translated as a plant stand…[but] no amount of translation 
will turn a toaster into a cell phone.’ A feature of strategy tools is that they embed particular 
content and are often presented using visual frameworks. Hence, while strategy tools can be 
adapted, their affordances also bracket what may and may not be discussed. For example, when 
managers use a BCG matrix, they will be inclined to see some strategic activities as stars and 
others as cash cows (Armstrong and Brodie, 1994), so that strategic focus is oriented towards the 
categories available within the tool. Therefore, the content and structure of the tool channel 
potential improvisations as the tool is used (statement 3.3).  
Agency of actors in the application of strategy tools (Arrow 4).  
Given these affordances, how do managers mobilize strategy tools? Again, we can refer to 
interpretive and political dimensions, where actors can use tools to make sense of uncertain 
environments, advocate particular points of view, and legitimate certain courses of action. 
Strategy is inherently a social process, where a good deal of strategy making takes place in 
meetings and workshops (Hendry and Seidl, 2003; Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 
2010) and implementation depends on broad swaths of the organization (Balogun and Johnson, 
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2004). Strategy tools are one important means by which managers navigate these social 
dynamics while at the same time working to develop strategic insights. 
Research on strategy practices has suggested that it involves both sensemaking and 
‘sensegiving’ (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Top managers must 
sort out the ambiguous signals from the environment and then convey their insights to others; 
and they can use strategy tools in both of these functions. As Grant (2003) demonstrates, some 
executives in oil majors used strategic planning templates and tools to support communication 
and coordination between corporate and divisional managers. Similarly, middle managers 
responsible for implementing strategy can use tools to convey the deliverables expected during 
critical phases, such as mergers (Whittington et al., 2006), or communicating key concerns to 
senior managers during strategic change (Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009). Thus, actors use 
tools as interpretive devices that enable them to focus attention on and make sense of strategic 
issues for themselves and for others (statement 4.1). 
Some studies characterize any use of tools to justify positions taken for ‘non-rational’ 
reasons as incorrect or bad for practice (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). 
Yet, research on strategy making shows that, in practice, actors find it useful to marshal tools to 
legitimate particular positions or viewpoints (statement 4.2). Tools can be mobilized in political 
processes by actors who are looking for ways to contain or influence strategic debate 
(Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002). Related studies on strategic planning and accounting echo these 
insights. Vaara, Sorsa and Palli’s (2010) study of the City of Lahti (Finland) finds that actors 
imbued strategic planning texts with ‘textual agency’ that enabled shifts in power relations in the 
organization. These shifts in power forced consensus and legitimized certain courses of action. 
Denis et al’s (2006) study of health care boards shows that by mapping quantitative metrics onto 
dominant values in the organization, actors made a controversial decision palatable to others. 
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The numbers filled ‘the strategic void created by pluralism’ (p. 350) and conveyed ‘consistency, 
transparency and competence’ (p. 362) that disempowered adversaries. Similarly, studies of 
auditing and accounting (Nahapiet, 1988; Pentland, 1993) show how accounting rubrics get used 
to transform the uncertain into the certain by categorizing and quantifying data. That is, using a 
strategy tool to justify a position does not get in the way of the use of the tool, it is a use of the 
tool (Weick, 1998). 
As people engage in these negotiations, they work with the tools. And, as actors work 
with tools, they adapt them to fit the needs at hand (statement 4.3). As Orlikowski (1992) finds in 
her analysis of one organization’s implementation of computer-aided software engineering 
(CASE) tools, users modify the functionality of the tools in order to make them more useful in 
daily practice. Such improvisatory uses of tools are responses to real life situations. By adapting 
tools to their particular purposes, actors are able to negotiate their way through the specific 
demands of their context. For example, Haspeslagh (1982) finds that experienced managers 
adapted portfolio analysis tools and techniques from the corporate level for which they were 
intended to the business unit level, which they did not see as a deviation but rather as a practical 
way to make better use of the tool for strategy making. By implication, increased complexity or 
uncertainty does not necessarily lead to more ‘mistakes’ in the use of tools, as March (2006) 
would suggest, but rather to adaptive behavior to make tools useful. 
Outcomes  
When considering outcomes, a functionalist view of tools prevails in the literature. This view 
assumes that, ‘correctly’ used, tools can achieve the ‘right’ outcome. Failure to achieve such an 
outcome indicates an inadequacy of the tool or the user (Lozeau et al., 2002). March’s (2006: 
208) main concern in his critique of strategy tools is the risk that such ‘technologies of 
rationality’ would produce ‘disasters’ when trusted to find solutions in inappropriate situations. 
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Yet, he is not trying simply to prevent these disasters. He is trying to balance the potential for 
tools to be used to identify new possibilities in more complex situations with the risk that this 
exploration might lead to ‘costly, even deadly’ errors. His dilemma begins to open up the 
possibility for alternative criteria against which to evaluate the use of tools. We use a practice 
lens to build on this idea, suggesting that an assessment of outcomes can be extended to consider 
not only whether a ‘successful’ strategic outcome for the organization was attained but also 
whether the tool-in-use produced a range of other organizational or individual outcomes for the 
actors and tools themselves.  
The strategy-as-practice research agenda has called for consideration of a wider range of 
outcomes beyond firm performance (Johnson et al., 2007; Whittington, 2006). Yet, research has 
not yet fulfilled this agenda, having privileged detailed explanations of the practices of making 
strategy as a first stage in the development of the field (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2010). Studies 
of outcomes associated with strategy tools are rare, with the exception of Armstrong and 
Brodie’s (1994) lab experiment showing how using the BCG matrix shaped participants’ 
evaluation of a decision task.  
Outcomes associated with strategy tools (Arrow 5).  
Why is it that certain tools become widely used and others not? This field-level question in tool 
use is a less-explored aspect of the strategy-as-practice agenda (Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Whittington, 2006). It calls attention to the huge industry of individuals and organizations 
making and selling strategy tools (academics, business executives and consultants). Institutional 
theory could provide one set of approaches for future analysis. It offers theories about the 
mechanisms of institutionalization and isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that point us 
to consider the degree to which a tool becomes routinized in organizational practice or 
institutionalized in the field as a salient outcome. 
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Some strategy tools get routinized into organizational and educational life. As highlighted 
above, Porter’s (1980) Five Forces, the SWOT framework and many other tools are well-known 
and frequently used. On the flip side, the list of tools that have been developed and proposed by 
consultants or academics yet never get widely adopted is too long to enumerate. Some tools, 
such as the BCG ‘star’/ ‘dog’ matrix, now persist at a moderate level of use after a prior peak in 
popularity (McCabe and Narayanan, 1991). Thus, the ‘success’ of the use of a strategy tool can 
be examined at the organizational and field levels, where success is associated with adoption and 
routinization in organizational practice (statement 5.1), diffusion and wide adoption in 
management education (statement 5.2) and diffusion and wide adoption by managers in 
organizations (statement 5.3).  
We might find a starting point for assessing these statements in Zbaracki’s (1998) 
analysis of the rhetoric and reality of total quality management (TQM) implementation. In this 
study, he digs into the details of how managers constructed their TQM programs to conform to 
rhetorics of success that then fueled the processes of institutionalization. In related work from 
science studies, Owen-Smith (2005) looks at how university technology licensing officers 
structured their work around the dockets that contain all of the background information about the 
invention. He documents that, in rationalizing their actions through ongoing organizational 
learning, these officers stabilized and institutionalized particular work procedures and language 
associated with building and maintaining dockets. Research on practices in management 
education (Kipping et al., 2004) and management consulting (Kipping, 1999a) offers another 
starting point for analysis of the institutionalization of some tools and not others. For example, 
evidence that management education is associated with greater use of strategy tools 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) suggests that management education and, by corollary business 
schools, are a key institutionalization mechanism for strategy tools.  
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Outcomes associated with actors in organizations (Arrow 6).  
A standard approach to assessing tools is to evaluate whether the use of the tool led to an 
accurate analysis and a successful strategy. The problem with these criteria is that such outcomes 
are often only known in the long term and are difficult to ascribe to the use of the tool itself. The 
case of Shell Oil’s famous anticipation of the 1970’s oil embargo has been used to justify the 
power of scenario tools (Schwartz, 1991). Merck’s use of real options to manage its R&D 
portfolio has been equally lauded (Nichols and Lewent, 1994). But, these examples are few and 
far between, and, in the case of Merck, scholars have called into question the attribution of the 
company’s success to the tool (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001). From the standpoint of actors in 
organizations, there are many more proximate measures of the usefulness of strategy tools.  
March (2006: 209) suggests that we should be concerned with how a tool is mobilized for 
exploratory search. The tension of most concern to him was whether such explorations – 
provoked by the (mis-)use of tools, or their use in settings for which they are not suited – might 
be worth the risk:  
‘Technologies of rational choice…are not simple instruments of exploitation but (partly) 
instruments of exploration hiding behind a façade of exploitation: revolutionaries in pin-
stripe suits. As such, they should perhaps be seen less as stodgy agents of conventional 
knowledge than as dangerous fools, joining thereby the pool of dreams out of which 
come great ideas as well as monstrous and idiotic ones.’  
 
Whether a strategy is ultimately ‘great’ or ‘idiotic’ may only be known well into the future. As a 
more immediate outcome, we can assess the degree to which the improvisational use of the tool 
provoked exploration (statement 6.1).  
Using tools can also produce consensus or at least provisional settlements (Kaplan and 
Orlikowski, 2013) that can be the basis of a strategic choice. Research has pointed out that not all 
strategy making efforts lead to decisions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Pettigrew, 1977). 
Decisions may be deferred either by choice or by the inability to reach a conclusion (Kaplan, 
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2008). The degree to which the use of a tool enables interim decisions that allow a project or 
organization to move forward may be an outcome in and of itself (statement 6.2).  
Another measure of success in the use of a tool is the degree to which the ‘client’ of the 
particular strategy project in which a tool is used is satisfied with the outcome of the project 
(statement 6.3). Inside an organization, a team may engage in strategic analysis for an executive 
who is the client for that project. The literature on team performance (e.g., Wageman et al., 
2005) suggests that the satisfaction of a team’s client is a centrally important outcome. In the 
case of management consultants, the paying client has commissioned the study and may be more 
or less content with the services provided (Czarniawska and Mazza, 2003; Kipping, 1999a; 
McKenna, 2006). Such client satisfaction, while it may be difficult to assign solely to the use of 
the tool, is thus a relevant outcome.  
The strategy-as-practice field has focused attention on the actors who make strategy 
(Whittington, 2006), pointing out that actors pursue their own interests – either in supporting one 
view over another (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Kaplan, 2008; Sonenshein, 2010) or in 
achieving career objectives (Mantere and Vaara, 2008) – as much as those of the organizations to 
which they belong. Yet, little is known about how the use of strategy tools connects to these 
objectives. Some studies suggest that managers may use tools to demonstrate their educational 
skill base (Jarratt and Stiles, 2010; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) and generate status and career 
outcomes (Baruch and Peiperl, 2000; Jarratt and Stiles, 2010; Legge et al., 2007) by being more 
competent in the use of the tool than their peers. The ability to speak the language of strategy 
through skilled use of strategy concepts is critical for participating in and influencing strategy-
making activities (Astley and Zammuto, 1992; Barry and Elmes, 1997). The very concept of 
competence in strategy making is embedded within a normative strategy discourse in which the 
use of such tools constitutes an actor’s identity and subjectivity as a strategist (Knights and 
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Morgan, 1991). The reverse is also true. Chesley and Wenger’s (1999) study of the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard shows that, by providing a systematic means to assess 
individual performance, it created career anxieties for those feeling less competent. Given that 
actors have different degrees of competence in using strategy tools, using such tools could 
provoke similar career anxieties (if a person was unable to master the tool) or contribute to a 
person’s advancement (if he or she were seen to be a proficient user of the tool). Thus, the 
success of a tool may be assessed by the degree to which its use helps an actor demonstrate 
competence (statement 6.4).  
Relatedly, the use of a tool can also constrain or enable discretion of individual actors. 
Hodgkinson et al (2006) finds that most of the organizations they surveyed used strategy 
workshops (an enabling technology if not precisely a strategy tool under our definition) to 
exclude middle managers, thus reinforcing the power of elites. Hodgkinson and Wright’s (2002) 
examination of scenarios concludes that their use provoked intense concerns about the personal 
impact of potentially negative futures. As a result, members of the senior management team 
engaged in a variety of coping mechanisms that led to the ‘failure’ of the process. This failure 
was actually a ‘success’ for those actors who would have been disadvantaged by the proposed 
strategy. In this case, using a tool will be considered a success to the extent that actors are able to 
achieve their personal objectives such as the legitimacy of their own roles or the ratification of a 
preferred strategy (statement 6.5). 
These kinds of power dynamics and interpersonal tradeoffs imply that the use of a tool 
can involve different degrees of contestation about interests or ideas and may lead to different 
degrees of shared understanding about the strategic problem and its potential solution. The 
development of strategy repeatedly has been shown to be political, requiring negotiation across 
various actors with different interests and frames of reference (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; 
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Kaplan, 2008; Pettigrew, 1977). Strategy tools are likely to be enlisted in this process of 
surfacing and resolving differences across actors (statement 6.6). For example, Kaplan (2011) 
shows that actors mobilized PowerPoint technology to carve up strategic territory, excluding 
some actors and ideas and including others.  
It is important to note that scholarship on the outcomes of strategy tools-in-use is largely 
absent. A first step to building research in this area is recognizing the multiplicity of possible 
outcomes for both tools and the actors who use them. The framework we develop leads 
researchers to problematize the notion of ‘successful’ or ‘correct’ use of tools, as success in one 
dimension or for one actor may be failure on another dimension or for another actor. 
ILLUSTRATING A FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE 
To illustrate some of the dynamics in Figure 1, we offer a vignette of a tool-in-use drawn from 
fieldwork studying the strategy-making processes at a multinational telecommunications 
equipment company (‘CommCorp’) facing a significant industry crisis.2 Because the exploration 
of strategy tools-in-use was not the focus of the data collection, we use it as only as a way to give 
life to a few of the statements in Table 1.  
 This vignette involves the introduction at CommCorp of a standard tool in strategic 
management, the ‘aggregate project plan’ originally proposed by Wheelwright and Clark (1992). 
This tool is a matrix intended as a means to assess the balance of innovation efforts in an 
organization’s project portfolio by plotting projects on two dimensions according to the extent of 
product and process change required. CommCorp was going through radical changes in the 
environment that required a new strategic approach (this was a communications technology 
company during the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2001-2002). The head of technology 
strategy (‘Brad’) announced he would bring together his team to discuss a realignment of their 
                                                 
2
 These data come from a wider study of strategy making in CommCorp as reported in other publications, including 
Kaplan (2008), Kaplan (2011) and Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013). The names of the company and individual 
managers are disguised. We were equally inspired by Jarzabkowski’s fieldwork (e.g., Jarzabkowski 2008). 
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strategy. The challenge was complex, both strategically in terms of the issues and socially in 
binding together the team that would have to work on them: 
We are going to create a team of people that are going to look at the business dimensions, 
at what the return is. We are going to have marketing people and economists and business 
planners…We would not want to make a technology decision that did not have some 
well-founded reason and rationale. 
 
Managers were searching for tools that might facilitate analysis and decisions in this 
context. The aggregate project plan tool had already been introduced to CommCorp through an 
executive education course at a top business school. The tool became known within the 
organization as ‘bubble charts’ because it involved using ‘bubbles’ to locate projects on the two-
by-two matrix. ‘Chris,’ a team member who had recently been promoted to senior management 
and wanted to demonstrate his abilities, proposed that he would use the bubble charts to analyze 
the portfolio. Some felt that this tool would be useful in providing a rational basis for making 
decisions: ‘Some kind of quantitative effort to say what kind of measures you would apply to 
this, from very bad to very good. At least if you apply that consistently across your analysis then 
you actually have something which you can measure.’ Thus Chris selected the tool because of 
his expertise in its use (2.3) and also because the tool was seen as a way to provide a rational 
basis for decisions (1.3). But this choice was also guided by anticipation that its use would give 
legitimacy to certain technology strategy decisions and anticipation of certain outcomes, 
especially Chris’ personal objective to advance his own career. 
In applying the tool, Chris immediately changed the original (product and process 
change) dimensions of the matrix to depict two new dimensions – product reach and market 
reach. He felt these externally-oriented dimensions would be more useful in analyzing the 
CommCorp project portfolio during the period of crisis. The emphasis on the market was 
essential during the economic crisis because no strategy could go forward without a market 
justification (a change for this organization which had previously been very technology focused). 
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Thus, he appropriated the existing matrix structure (4.3) and adapted it for his local context. 
Subsequently, during a senior management meeting, executives hotly debated the dimensions 
and proposed many other alternatives, including technology reach, risk and return, and size of 
investment. Managers supported different ideas for a variety of reasons: some because particular 
axes would favor preferred projects, some because of particular views about the external 
environment, some because of concerns about internal politics. As one executive noted, ‘There 
are different views about the definitions of the axes and the ranking of projects, and these need to 
be clarified and aligned as a group.’ The tool became a vehicle for surfacing and contesting 
various actors’ interests (3.2). Said one manager, ‘It is very clear that [one executive] would rank 
the projects very differently than [another executive]. Guaranteed.’ Over the course of the 
discussion, it became apparent that Brad had preferred outcomes in mind, as he attempted to use 
the indicators in the bubble charts to convince the others that they did not have enough ‘Hail 
Mary’ (radical innovation) projects. 
Because of these differences, the discussion was tabled until further work could be done. 
The managers did not make a decision about the final portrayal of the portfolio (6.2). In this 
sense, the use of the tool ‘failed.’ But the team came away from the discussion collectively 
focused on the need to evaluate projects in terms of risk and reward over both the short term and 
the long term and a clearer understanding of where each person in the organization stood on 
different issues. Hence, the use of the ‘bubble charts’ led to several strategic outcomes but not 
because the tool was used ‘correctly.’ The use of the tool led CommCorp managers to consider 
new sources of data (6.1), debate a range of issues (6.6) and discuss what achieving a ‘Hail 
Mary’ might look like (6.5). These explorations might not have been productive in reaching an 
immediate decision, but they did break down existing frames about the situation and opened up 
the organization to potential new avenues for growth.  
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RECURSIVE DYNAMICS BETWEEN SELECTION, APPLICATION AND 
OUTCOMES 
 
This vignette has illustrated how some aspects of our model in Figure 1 might operate in 
practice. As it shows, no single rationale is responsible for tool selection, multiple features guide 
application, and various outcomes are achieved as tools are used. Further, if we turn to Arrows 
A, B and C in Figure 1, we argue that the selection, application and outcomes of tool-in-use are 
intertwined. Each arrow is double-headed, indicating that the influences move in both directions 
and are mutually interdependent. To date, there is little theoretical or empirical understanding 
about how these relationships work. In Table 2, we offer an initial set of guiding statements that 
we intend to provoke future research into the types of effects that should be of interest. To do so, 
we draw on and integrate various streams of research in strategic management, tracing out their 
implications for tools-in-use. 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
Starting with Arrow A – the relationship between selection and application – we can 
make the superficially obvious point that the application of a tool in strategy making is shaped by 
which tool is selected (statement A1). Each tool has its own affordances and these will constrain 
and enable its use. Reciprocally, tool selection may be shaped at least partially by anticipation of 
a particular application (A2). This could be seen through the rationalist view undergirding 
positioning theories of competitive strategy (Ghemawat, 1999; Porter, 1980): certain analytical 
problems require specific tools to analyze them. Political theories of strategy making (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977) enrich this view by highlighting that actors will select 
tools precisely because their particular affordances are more easily applied to some problems 
than others and likely to favor some kinds of solutions over others. Indeed, the subtlety of this 
relationship between selection and application may be inferred from the ‘garbage can’ model of 
decision making (Cohen et al., 1972); that tools may be known solutions looking for problems to 
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which they can be applied (A3).  
Turning to Arrow B – the relationship between application and outcomes – our 
processual view implies that the use of tools evolves: as tools are applied, actors’ goals and the 
outcomes they are able to achieve can shift (B1). This view is grounded in the body of research 
on emergent strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) in which the strategic 
outcomes realized by an organization arise from an evolving stream of actions. Further, as goals 
shift, the applications of the tools may have to be adapted (B2). On the other hand, as political 
models suggest (Pettigrew 1977), actors may also instrumentally adapt the application of a tool 
based on anticipated or desired outcomes (B3). 
Finally, in Arrow C – the relationship between outcomes and selection – we highlight the 
effects of tool use over time. Learning theories posit success as an important activator of 
‘learning by doing’ (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; Greve, 2003; Levitt and March, 1988), where 
prior organizational performance determines whether organizations search for new solutions or 
reinforce old ones. Thus when the application of particular tools has enabled actors to achieve at 
least some of their desired outcomes, such tools are likely to be selected for future strategy-
making processes (C1). Reciprocally, tool selection is shaped at least partially by anticipation of, 
or desire for, a particular outcome (C2). This relationship between tools and outcomes could 
become routinized and self-reinforcing such that it could be a source of inertia in the face of 
change in organizational circumstances (C3). That is, a core competence in the use of a tool 
(reinforced by success) could become a ‘core rigidity’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or source of 
organizational ‘myopia’ (Levinthal and March, 1993) when the tool continues to be selected 
under conditions for which it is no longer appropriate. 
 By paying attention to the recursive relationships between tools and actors through the 
interlinked processes of selection, application and achieving outcomes, scholars can advance 
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understanding in the strategic management field about how the tools we develop and teach can 
shape individual, organizational and field-level outcomes.  
DISCUSSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR STRATEGY TOOLS-IN-USE 
By viewing strategy tools as tools-in-use, we can understand that tools do not cause managers to 
make right or wrong decisions but rather enable them to engage in strategy making. Actors use 
tools for many reasons, in many ways, and in accomplishing a wide variety of outcomes. Hence, 
when strategy tools are thought of primarily as technologies of rationality, knowledge of the rich 
and complex ways in which actors learn, explore, improvise and thus make strategy with tools is 
limited. The main contribution of this paper is to develop a framework, Figure 1, which shifts the 
conversation about strategy tools away from characterizations of ‘good’ or ‘poor’ use and 
towards an understanding of how tools are used and are more or less useful. The accompanying 
statements in Tables 1 and 2 provide resources to guide empirical research on strategy tools-in-
use. These statements are not exhaustive, but rather represent a crystallization of what is known 
or what can be inferred from current research. Our goal is to promote further research on these 
topics. 
Implications for research on strategy making 
One implication for research is that the contrast between the ‘rationality’ of economic man with 
the ‘irrationality’ of use is not analytically useful. March (2006) argues that deviations from 
procedural rationality can be regarded as potentially problematic for the firm. A practice lens 
suggests instead that, in their political and interpretive practices, actors seek rationality and make 
attempts to convey rationality as they make strategy (Cabantous and Gond, 2011). As Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) pointed out, rationality is a social convention prescribing a certain set of values 
that actors should hold. Thus, being or appearing to be rational is an ‘effortful accomplishment’ 
(Lounsbury, 2008: 353). Strategy tools are implicated in the ways that actors engage in these 
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efforts to produce rational accounts of their strategy making. The more that tools become part of 
the organizational routines of strategy making, the more they come to symbolize these intendedly 
rational strategic processes. The framework presented here allows us to reconcile views of 
strategy tools as ‘technologies of rationality’ and as ‘tools-in-use.’ In particular, mapping the 
recursive loops between selection, application and outcomes provides an integrated 
understanding of how people mobilize tools to enact a rational ideal, and in doing so achieve a 
wide variety of outcomes for themselves and the organizations in which they operate. 
A second implication for research is that a practice lens on strategy tools directs attention 
away from a sole focus on whether or not the strategy makers ‘got it right’ in terms of firm 
performance. Instead, it points us towards outcomes related to the processes of strategy making – 
such as settlement on a decision, satisfaction with the outcome, contestation in the process, 
discretion of the actor – which may be critical indicators of success for the actors who use tools, 
or to the institutionalization of the tool within the organization or the field. With this broader 
range of outcomes to assess, scholars may be less prone to judge the use of a tool as poor and 
more likely to examine how and why actors use tools and how the use of a tool constrains and 
enables strategy making.  
Where positioning theories of strategy have assumed that strategy is a largely analytical 
and relatively tractable task (e.g., Ghemawat, 1999; Porter, 1980), our model of strategy tools-in-
use suggests that these intendedly rational activities are implicated in political and interpretive 
processes. These processes are not deviations from use but rather are motivated by participants’ 
different viewpoints and goals, enabling them to cope with uncertainties. The introduction of 
strategy tools does not remove the politics or emotions of strategy making. Instead tools can be 
coopted and adapted to match the circumstances. To political theories of strategy making (e.g., 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Pettigrew, 1977), our framework offers tool-in-use as another 
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arena in which to examine how political processes play out. Further, it emphasizes that even 
highly politicized processes of strategy making are also shaped by the intended rationality of the 
participants choosing and using the tools.  
Extensions of the framework of strategy tools-in-use 
There are at least three natural extensions of our framework of strategy tools-in use that could be 
explored in future research: examining the different implications for the creation of new tools, 
for different types of tools, and for different types of actors.  
Our focus has been on those strategy tools either developed from management theory 
and/ or taught in business schools in order to encourage us as strategy academics to reflect more 
upon our role in the practice of strategy tools-in-use. However, as managers may also create new 
tools for their own purposes, a natural extension of our analysis would be to focus on the de novo 
development of strategy tools. Why would a manager develop a new tool when there are so 
many already available? Drawing from our framework, such research might find that actors 
make new tools in order to provide quantifications of contentious issues. Actors may create tools 
to demonstrate a particular level of competence or to have influence over subsequent strategy 
discussions and outcomes, as others will be less versed in the tool. Building from this, we may 
also query, how are newly developed tools incorporated into organizational practice? Do the 
selection, application and outcomes of de novo tools mimic the adaptation and re-purposing of 
existing tools, as outlined in our framework, or do new analytical categories emerge? These 
subjects are open terrain for future scholars.   
The variation in existing types of strategy tools also merits exploration. Some (such as 
real options tools) are quantitative and embedded in spreadsheets or other software. Others are 
more easily captured with simple visual representations (e.g., the aggregate project plan or 
BCG’s star/dog framework). These features are affordances that will surely constrain and enable 
 Strategy tools-in-use  - 31 - 
different types of actions. For example, a tool that requires detailed quantitative analysis may not 
be chosen because actors do not feel competent to use it. Alternatively, the quantitative metrics 
in a spreadsheet may be easier to manipulate in order to support a desired strategic choice. A 
visual tool may be easier to adapt to the specific needs of the organization, much as we saw the 
participants at CommCorp adapt the ‘bubble charts.’ Scholars have the opportunity to attend to 
the different affordances of different types of tools. 
Finally, it should be clear from our analysis that not all actors are the same. Most work on 
strategy tools to date has had a distinctively senior management focus (Frost, 2003; Stenfors et 
al., 2007), although scholars have readily pointed out that middle managers play a central role in 
strategy making (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Burgelman, 1994). In addition, strategy officers 
within organizations and external consultants are regularly involved in making strategy. It seems 
natural that these different actors might choose different tools and use them differently because 
of their diverse sources of power, varied levels of expertise, and the wide range of outcomes at 
stake. How might the dynamics portrayed in our model of strategy tools-in-use change if we 
were to focus on any one of these different communities of actors or on the interactions between 
them? 
Methodological approaches to studying strategy tools-in-use 
To pursue these research avenues, we need an expanded portfolio of methods. Our view of 
strategy tools-in-use opens up different levels and units of analysis for research. That is, strategy 
scholars should not only focus on the firm as a monolithic whole, but also consider analyses of 
individuals (their interests, career aspirations, skillful demonstration of competence), teams or 
groups (their efforts to work together, their learning, their resolution of differences), projects 
(who is involved, how the problem is defined, how progress occurs, whether decisions are 
reached), the tools (their characteristics, the degree to which they are adopted and 
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institutionalized) and the field (the institutionalized practices, the professions and professionals 
who develop and sell tools).  
To achieve this breadth of research on strategy tools, scholars will want to employ 
multiple methods. Current work is dominated by observational field studies (e.g., Jarzabkowski, 
2008; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Rouleau, 2005; Samra-Fredericks, 2003). This approach 
will remain an essential source of insight for studying tools-in-use. If we want to understand 
strategy tools, there is little substitute for spending time in the field watching organizational 
members use them. The challenge for this kind of work, however, is that it is often difficult to 
track tools – especially if they are subject to many handoffs, potentially across many locations – 
or to identify in advance the type of interactions with tools that should comprise the unit of study 
(Bechky, 2008). The actual use of tools is emergent, requiring the researcher to be in the right 
context at the right time to observe what unfolds.  
Surveys and interviews are useful supplements. Elsbach’s (2004) study of workplace 
identity is one model. She conducted surveys about objects that signaled identity and then 
followed up with interviews to understand when such objects mattered most. Bechky (2008) 
brought particular artifacts to interviews and asked interviewees to explain how and when they 
used the artifacts. Balogun et al (2003) suggest that interview protocols might be extended to 
discussion groups and self-reports, methods that are not yet well-established in strategic 
management. Surveys would also be helpful in contexts where ethnographic work is not feasible, 
such as in complex, multi-divisional or multinational organizations. 
Recently, scholars have noted that visual evidence of artifacts as they are used and as 
they change over time (i.e., photographs of artifacts, such as design blueprints and prototypes) is 
a rich source of data (Bechky, 2008; Meyer et al., 2013). With a few exceptions (e.g., Dougherty 
and Kunda, 1992; Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; Kaplan, 2011), scholars have had challenges in 
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introducing such visual evidence into journal articles because visual research methods are not yet 
established in management (Ray and Smith, 2012). Nonetheless, we argue that visual analysis 
will be a crucial aspect of future research on strategy tools. For example, if we return to the 
CommCorp vignette, photos of the changing labels attributed to the axes of the ‘bubble charts’ 
over successive meetings could provide evidence of how tools-in-use are mobilized in 
contestations of meaning. 
Following Armstrong and Brodie’s (1994) early lead, we also expect that experiments 
could offer insights into strategy tools. By manipulating either the content or structure of the tool 
or the circumstances of analysis and negotiation, research might be able to understand at a micro-
level how tools shape group interactions. This could provide a point of contact with behavioral 
approaches to strategy (see Gavetti et al., 2012, for a recent summary) and the emerging stream 
of work on the micro-foundations of strategy (Abell et al., 2008), allowing these researchers to 
incorporate material circumstances, such as the use of strategy tools, into their analyses.  
If we are to look at the institutionalization of strategy tools at the field level, then 
historical methods such as those used to analyze management consulting and other management 
practices will be called for (Kipping, 1996, 1999b; McKenna, 2006) as well as the related tools 
used by institutional theorists (e.g., Lounsbury, 2003; Schneiberg and Soule, 2005; Zietsma and 
Lawrence, 2010). One useful handhold is Ansari et al’s (2010) framework for studying practice 
variation that links organizational mechanisms of implementation with field-level mechanisms of 
diffusion. Furthermore, the study of tools may span levels of analysis, as scholars examine the 
recursive elements of tool use, from actors’ selection of a widely institutionalized tool, to their 
modification of it and the spread of such modifications within and outside the organization (for 
example, Zbaracki, 1998).  
As a further extension, scholars can also examine tools as cultural artifacts that reflect 
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social reality (Hatch, 1993; Schein, 1990). By studying one tool, in the way that cultural scholars 
have examined artifacts such as doctors’ lab coats (Fiol and O'Connor, 2005), we can explore the 
social identities of the users or the producers of tools. A field-level mapping of the evolution of 
strategy tools over time would give insight into how strategic management is conceived as an 
activity and a profession. By exploring how tools are constructed and used over time in a field, 
as Kaghan and Lounsbury (2005) have done for technology transfer contracts in the technology 
licensing field, we can gain a perspective on how institutional understandings are embedded in 
tools.  
Thus, a framework of strategy tools-in-use provokes scholars to examine a greater variety 
of units of analysis using a broader range of methods than is typical in the core strategic 
management field or in the strategy-as-practice community. Doing so will generate a more 
dynamic and nuanced understanding of how strategy tools enable and constrain strategy making.  
Implications for managers and for our practice as teachers of strategy 
In the past decade, there has been much debate about the usefulness of management education 
and more or less explicitly about management tools (Baldridge et al., 2004; Farjoun, 2007; 
Ferraro et al., 2005; Markides, 2011; Mintzberg, 2004; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Shepherd et al., 
2004; Vermeulen, 2005). These concerns are threefold: that managers might not use the tools we 
teach them; that if they do, they may misuse them; and that they might use the wrong tools. An 
analysis of strategy tools-in-use should inform this discussion by allowing us to understand 
which tools are used, why ‘misuse’ (meaning use outside the textbook description) may not be 
‘wrong,’ and what outcomes managers actually seek from tools. This perspective refocuses our 
attention as strategy teachers on ensuring that managers are better equipped to use tools for the 
purposes that are of value to them.  
Our framework provides insight into the actual (and often unintended) practices of using 
 Strategy tools-in-use  - 35 - 
strategy tools. For managers, tools should not be perceived as neutral objects that can eliminate 
politics from strategy making, but rather as one means for surfacing assumptions, asking tough 
questions and aligning interests within the organization. Using a tool is undoubtedly helpful in 
enabling managers to convey rationality in contexts that privilege the idea of rationality. 
However, a framework of tools-in-use highlights the ways that managers continuously devise 
and revise strategy, testing and modifying it within the context of their actions and interactions. 
Said differently, strategy is not something an organization has but rather something that people 
in organizations do (Whittington, 2006). Tools are most usefully seen as parts of the process 
rather than purely as sources of the ‘answer.’ 
Those of us who teach strategy or develop strategic tools or frameworks, typically 
conceive of our task in the ‘instrumental mode’ (Astley and Zammuto, 1992: 453) of 
contributing tools and techniques to managers. Yet, many of us have long suspected that tools do 
not operate as they are ostensibly designed to do. In viewing strategy tools as tools-in-use, we 
can understand our practice as operating equally in the ‘conceptual or symbolic mode’ in which 
we offer ways of thinking and means for discussion. This has implications for how we teach 
strategy tools in the classroom: we should not just convey the content of the tools and 
frameworks but also emphasize how they are used in practice: e.g., for achieving closure, for 
individual advancement, for delineating territories, for structuring conversation, and for 
achieving shared understanding. The framework proposed in this paper should provide 
guidelines for exploring these relationships in future research on strategy tools.  
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Table 1: Dynamics of strategy tools-in-use 
  
Selection Application Outcomes 
 
 
There is no one right tool for each 
situation. The affordances of the 
tools as well as the bounded 
rationality and constrained agency 
of the actors who want to use them 
shape which tools are selected. 
Tools are applied 
improvisationally by 
organizational actors, both to 
interpret the strategic context and 
pursue preferences and interests. 
Outcomes of tool use extend beyond 
the achievement of a strategic 
decision in an individual project, to 
individual, group, organizational 







flexibility of a 








1.1. The selection of tools may be 
more dependent on 
organizationally standardized use 
than on the ‘fit’ of the tool with the 
situation in the environment  
1.2. The selection of tools may be 
influenced by the degree to which 
they are simple and offer clear 
visual representations, where 
simpler tools are easier to 
remember and use.  
1.3. The selection of quantitative 
tools is attractive to users because 
numbers can signal rationality, but 
this attractiveness is offset by 
potentially greater difficulty in 
using the tool  
Arrow 3 
3.1. Tools provide a common 
language for strategic 
conversations between managers 
across hierarchical, functional 
and geographic boundaries  
3.2. Tools create a space for 
social interactions about strategy 
at which actors can negotiate 
their different interests  
3.3 The content and structure of 
the tool channel potential 
improvisations as the tool is used. 
 
Arrow 5 
The ‘success’ of the use of a tool at 
the organizational level can be 
measured by the degree to which: 
5.1. It is adopted and routinized in 
organizational practice. 
 
The ‘success’ of the use of a tool at 
the field level can be measured by 
the degree to which: 
5.2 It diffuses and is widely 
adopted in management education. 
5.3 It diffuses and is widely 







and use tools 







2.1. Actors may select tools based 
on satisficing. They pick the first 
tool that they know how to use (or 
are familiar with) that seems to fit 
the problem at hand. 
2.2. Actors have more or less 
freedom to select a tool, depending 
on their position in the hierarchy 
Arrow 4 
4.1. Actors use tools as 
interpretive devices that enable 
them to focus attention on and 
make sense of strategic issues for 
themselves and for others.  
4.2. Actors find it useful to 
marshal tools to legitimate 
particular positions or viewpoints 
Arrow 6 
The ‘success’ of the use of the tool 
for actors can be measured by the 
degree to which: 
6.1 Its use provokes new 
explorations 
6.2 It enables interim decisions 
that allow a project or organization 
to move forward. 
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2.3. Actors have more or less 
freedom to select a tool depending 
on their competence in its use 
(expertise power) 
 
4.3 As actors work with tools, 
they adapt them to fit the needs at 
hand. 
 
6.3 Their ‘client’ is satisfied with 
the outcome of the project (internal 
client or consulting client). 
6.4 They demonstrate competence. 
6.5 Users achieve their personal 
objectives (legitimacy of position 
or ratification of a particular 
strategic choice). 
6.6 Differences across actors are 
surfaced and resolved. 
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A1: The application of a tool is 
shaped by which tool is 
selected 
A2: Tool selection is shaped at 
least partially by anticipation 
of a particular application.  
A3: Tools may be known 
solutions looking for problems 
to which they can be applied. 
B1: As tools are applied, 
actors’ goals and the outcomes 
that they are able to achieve 
can shift. 
B2: As goals shift, the 
applications of the tools may 
be adapted. 
B3: Actors may adapt the 
application of a tool based on 
anticipated or desired 
outcomes.  
 
C1: When the application of 
particular tools has enabled 
actors to achieve at least some 
of their desired outcomes, such 
tools are likely to be selected 
for future strategy-making 
processes 
C2: Tool selection is shaped at 
least partially by anticipation 
of or desire for a particular 
outcome. 
C3: The relationship between 
tools and outcomes could 
become routinized and self-
reinforcing such that it could 
be a source of inertia in the 
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Figure 1: A framework for understanding strategy tools-in-use 
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